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Domestic Violence and Gun Control: Determining the 
Proper Interpretation of ―Physical Force‖ in the 
Implementation of the Lautenberg Amendment 
Abigail Browning  
INTRODUCTION 
In the last half of the nineteenth century, public awareness of 
domestic violence rose as organizations, such as social purity leagues 
and temperance groups, campaigned for battered women‘s rights in 
the United States and Europe.
1
 The first juvenile and family courts in 
the United States were created in the early twentieth century, and 
with their creation came a clearer focus on domestic violence against 
women.
2
 Yet by the 1970s, the problems of domestic violence 
victims were viewed as family and personal problems of ―individual 
or social pathology.‖3  
Class action lawsuits brought against police departments in the 
1970s for failing to adequately protect battered women caused a shift 
in the criminal justice system‘s response to domestic violence.4 These 
 
  J.D. (2010), Washington University School of Law; B.A. (2007), Pomona College. I 
would like to thank the Editorial Board of the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
for their support and numerous contributions to this work. 
 1. R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE 156–57 (1992). During this period, and into the early twentieth century, laws to punish 
men who beat their wives were proposed in many state legislatures and in the British 
Parliament, but they rarely passed. Id. at 157. Punishment was even rarer, as the attention 
devoted to domestic violence in this early era focused more on maintaining public order and 
preventing crime than on protecting women. Id. 
 2. Id. at 159. Many cities in the United States focused on integrating psychology, social 
welfare, and notions of justice, and by 1920 there were juvenile, family, or domestic relations 
courts in over ten major cities. Id. at 158–59. 
 3. Id. at 160. ―The CJS [Criminal Justice System] was not considered the appropriate 
institution for dealing with violence against women within the home; it was now defined as a 
family and personal problem best dealt with through social and psychological solutions.‖ Id. 
 4. Id. at 165–66. These class actions ―raised public awareness of the problem, publicized 
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early lawsuits led to major institutional changes and legislative 
reform beginning in the late 1970s.
5
 Since then, domestic violence 
research has grown to include methods like gathering firsthand 
accounts from victims of domestic violence and their family 
members.
6
 Many accounts demonstrate how quickly violent words in 
a domestic relationship can develop into threats of violence involving 
guns or actual physical violence.
7
  
 
institutional forms of injustice, led to changes in State laws and set a precedent for police 
response all over the country.‖ Id. at 166.  
 5. Id. at 166–67. The movement for reform ―witnessed the creation of research and 
demonstration projects in law enforcement and police training in several states . . . . Innovative 
criminal justice programmes and new law enforcement legislation were often the result of local 
and national pressure by activists.‖ Id. at 167. 
 6. See DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 1, at 2–14 (examining the development of public 
awareness about domestic violence and recounting several firsthand accounts from research 
studies). 
 7. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue 
of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 66–68 (1991). Mahoney recounts a firsthand account from a 
victim, pregnant with her second child, whose verbally abusive husband yelled at her for hours 
each day. Id. at 66. One day, the woman worked up the courage to tell her husband that she 
could not stand his screaming any longer and that, if he did not stop the abuse, she would leave 
him. Id. The woman described his reaction:  
Suddenly he lost his temper . . . . He stormed upstairs, and I heard him pushing around 
in the closet. I thought, ―That‘s funny. It sounds like he‘s getting the gun.‖ And I 
didn‘t sit down or move—I stood in the middle of the living room floor and waited. He 
came down the stairs shouting and I saw that he really did have the shotgun. I knew it 
was fully loaded. I remember making the conscious decision that this was different 
than waiting through other outbursts, and that any argument would be deadly.  
Id. (alteration in original). Often victims of domestic violence first report assaults by violent 
partners or husbands within days, or even hours, of threats or violence using firearms, but 
reporting does not guarantee a victim‘s safety. See id. at 72–74 (describing instances where 
domestic violence victims were murdered even after seeking protection). For example, 
Mahoney points to the case of Godfrey v. Georgia. Id. at 72–73. In Godfrey, the domestic 
relationship involved an abusive husband and wife. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 424 
(1980). The husband‘s history of violent behavior caused the couple to separate in the past. Id. 
at 424 & n.3. One day, in the middle of a heated argument, Godfrey ―threatened his wife with a 
knife and damaged some of her clothing.‖ Id. at 424. The same day, she went to a Justice of the 
Peace to get a warrant for her husband‘s arrest. Id. Mrs. Godfrey moved out and went to live 
with her mother. Id. at 424–25. After Mr. Godfrey failed to convince his wife to return home, 
he got his shotgun and went to his mother-in-law‘s home. Id. ―He pointed the shotgun at his 
wife through the window and pulled the trigger. The charge from the gun struck his wife in the 
forehead and killed her instantly.‖ Id. at 425. Godfrey then ―proceeded into the trailer, striking 
and injuring his daughter with the barrel of the gun. He then fired the gun at his mother-in-law, 
striking her in the head and killing her instantly.‖ Id. 
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Beginning in the late 1970s, legislative efforts to prevent domestic 
violence addressed the most violent crimes that often lead to death, 
particularly those crimes committed with firearms.
8
 A major effort to 
prevent such fatal results is the Lautenberg Amendment, which 
makes it unlawful for an individual ―‗convicted of a misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence‘ to ship, transport, possess, or receive 
firearms or ammunition in or affecting commerce.‖9 The Lautenberg 
Amendment, passed in 1996, amends the Gun Control Act of 1968 
(―GCA‖), which defines the term ―misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence‖ to include ―the use or attempted use of physical 
force. . . .‖10  
This Note provides an overview of the legislative history of the 
Lautenberg Amendment and discusses the prior and subsequent 
legislative, sociological, and community efforts to combat and 
prevent domestic violence. In particular, this Note examines and 
critiques the circuit split over the interpretation of the GCA‘s 
―physical force‖ requirement.11 Finally, this Note proposes allowing 
for more latitude in judicial interpretation of the Lautenberg 
Amendment and the associated laws that combat domestic violence. 
I. ACADEMIC, SOCIETAL, AND GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
A. VAWA and Contemporary Domestic Violence Studies 
Although it is not a new phenomenon, addressing domestic 
violence only became a focus of legislative action relatively recently. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, researchers took a more critical look at 
domestic violence and identified indicators, precursors, and 
 
 8. See DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 1, at 128–42. 
 9. 18 U.S.C. § 922(G)(9) (2006); T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF 
CONG., CRS ORDER CODE RL31143, FIREARMS PROHIBITIONS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
CONVICTIONS: THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT 5 (2001). 
 10. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (2006); HALSTEAD, supra note 9, at 2. 
 11. The Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits hold that ―physical force,‖ as used in section 
921(a)(33)(A)(ii) requires more than ―mere touching.‖ See infra note 38 and accompanying 
text. The First, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits accept a much lower standard to satisfy the 
―physical force‖ requirement. Id. 
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incidence.
12
 Many studies take a critical look at non-violent behaviors 
that often occur alongside violent behaviors and examine the 
contemporaneous incidence of non-violent and violent behaviors in 
domestic relationships.
13
 Generally, studies like the Violent Men 
Study indicate that men tend to underreport the incidence of domestic 
violence in their relationships, skewing the statistics, particularly 
statistics that rely on self-reporting.
14
  
Despite concerns over the accuracy of statistics, many of the 
statutes enacted by Congress to combat domestic violence rely on 
statistical studies to guide legislation. One such step toward 
combating domestic violence at the federal level is the Violence 
Against Women Act (―VAWA‖).15 Enacted as part of the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
16
 VAWA makes it 
a federal crime for an individual to travel in interstate commerce with 
the intent to harm or intimidate a domestic partner and who, in the 
course of doing so, commits a crime of violence against that 
partner.
17
 Subtitle B of VAWA, entitled ―Safe Homes for Women,‖ 
 
 12. See Rebecca Emerson Dobash & Russel P. Dobash, Violent Men and Violent 
Contexts, in RETHINKING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 144–55 (R. Emerson Dobash & Russell 
P. Dobash eds., 1998). Projects like the Violent Men Study and Violence Against Wives 
emerged in relatively recent years. See id. at 144. The Violence Against Wives study was 
conducted in 1979 and the Violent Men Study in 1996. Id. Evidence from these studies and 
other domestic violence research reveals ―four general themes: men‘s possessiveness and 
jealousy, disagreements and expectations concerning domestic work and resources, men‘s sense 
of the right to punish ‗their‘ women for perceived wrongdoing, and the importance to men of 
maintaining or exercising their power and authority.‖ Id.  
 13. See, e.g., id. at 160–61. Indicators of imminent violent behavior include swearing, 
shouting, calling names, pretending to hit, and putting down a person with whom the offender is 
in a domestic relationship. Id. at 161.  
 14. See id. at 160. Research ―show[s] more concordance in men‘s and women‘s reports of 
men‘s use of various forms of controlling and intimidating behaviors than for violence and 
injuries,‖ but there is a significant difference between ―men‘s and women‘s reports of men‘s 
attempts to use children in arguments, men‘s attempts to control and restrict the woman‘s life 
and movements, putting her down, deliberately keeping her short of money and threatening to 
hurt the pets.‖ Id.  
 15. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified 
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. 
 16. See id. 
 17. 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1) (2006). The full text of the section states that:  
A person who travels in interstate or foreign commerce or enters or leaves Indian 
country or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States 
with the intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate a spouse, intimate partner, or dating 
partner, and who, in the course of or as a result of such travel, commits or attempts to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol33/iss1/9
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provides a list of safeguards and preventative measures to protect and 
educate past, present, and potential female victims of violence.
18
 
Congress amended the statute in October 2000, eliminating the 
requirement of ―either a completed commission of a crime of 
violence or bodily injury.‖19 VAWA also prescribes a set of penalties 
for violations depending on the ―extent of the bodily injury to the 
victim and whether a weapon [i]s used.‖20 VAWA is only one of 
several statutes written to combat domestic violence and provide 
redress and protection to past, present, and potential victims.
21
 
 
commit a crime of violence against that spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner, 
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). 
§ 2261(a)(1). Subsection (b) sets out penalties ranging from not more than five years to 
imprisonment for life, depending on the severity of the crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261(b). 
 Shortly after the enactment of VAWA, the Department of Justice obtained its first 
conviction under VAWA‘s interstate domestic violence enforcement provision. MARGARET C. 
JASPER, THE LAW OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 18 (1998). The case, tried in the Southern 
District of West Virginia, involved a man who ―beat his wife . . . until she collapsed.‖ Id. After 
placing her in his car trunk and driving for five days, the man finally took his wife to the 
hospital where she was diagnosed with irreversible brain damage. Id. Prosecutors obtained a 
conviction against the man ―who was sentenced to life in prison.‖ Id. at 19.  
 18. See id. at 2–3. Among other things, Subtitle B provides for a National Domestic 
Violence Hotline; gives monetary grants to state, tribal, and local governments to treat domestic 
violence as a serious criminal offense; and helps to subsidize the operating costs of battered 
women‘s shelters. Id. The subtitle also provides for funding for educating young people about 
domestic violence, provides grants for research regarding domestic violence, and provides 
money to nonprofit organizations that establish ―prevention/intervention domestic violence 
projects in local communities.‖ Id. at 3. 
 19. James M. Peters, Federal Domestic Violence Laws—2001, 44 ADVOCACY 15, 15 
(2001). 
 20. Id. at 17. 
 21. See id. at 18–19. For example, the Full Faith and Credit to Orders of Protection, 18 
U.S.C. § 2265, requires that ―a qualifying civil or criminal domestic protection order issued by 
a court in one state or Indian tribe shall be accorded full faith and credit by the courts of other 
states or tribes.‖ Id. at 18. The Amendment to ATF Form 4473 provides that a firearm 
purchaser must complete a form ―certifying that he or she is not subject to a valid protection 
order and has not been convicted of a qualifying misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.‖ Id. 
Another relevant statute, the Right of Victim to Speak at Bail Hearings, 18 U.S.C. § 2263, 
provides that ―victims of VAWA crimes have the right, if they want, to be heard at bail hearings 
regarding the danger posed by defendants,‖ and the Other Victims‘ Rights provision, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 10606(b), gives victims of federal crimes, including domestic violence victims the following 
rights:  
 The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim‘s 
dignity and privacy. 
 The right to be reasonably protected from the accused offender. 
 The right to be notified of court proceedings. 
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To aid implementation of VAWA and related programs, as well as 
to ―assist states in reorganizing law enforcement‘s response to violent 
crimes against women,‖ Congress allocated funds to the S.T.O.P. 
Violence Against Women Grant Program.
22
 Another obstacle to 
implementation is police officers‘ reluctance to become involved in 
domestic violence disputes.
23
 To this end, many jurisdictions 
instituted mandatory arrest policies.
24
 The Department of Justice also 
began a program in 1996 to help governments across the country 
―treat domestic violence as a serious criminal offense.‖25 VAWA also 
established funding for community education and policing.
26
 
 
 The right to be present at all public court proceedings related to the 
offense, . . . .  
 The right to confer with attorney for the Government in the case. 
 The right to restitution. 
 The right to information about the conviction, sentencing, imprisonment, 
and release of the offender. 
Id. 
 22. See JASPER, supra note 17, at 5–6. Within five years of instituting VAWA, ―a total of 
$800 million in federal funds was authorized under‖ the S.T.O.P. Violence Against Women 
Grant Program. Id. at 5. States must meet certain requirements before they can receive federal 
funding under the program. See id. at 6. As a result of these requirements, ―several states have 
passed laws or changed their administrative procedures to fund all forensic medical 
examinations for victims of sexual assault, thereby ensuring that criminal investigations in 
sexual assault cases are funded like all other criminal investigations—by the state and not by 
the victim.‖ Id. 
 23. Id. at 20–21. Jasper points out that police reluctance to become involved in domestic 
violence disputes is due to the fact that ―calls for police assistance are among the most complex, 
emotionally charged and potentially dangerous calls to which police respond.‖ Id. 
 24. Id. Mandatory arrest policies ―require[] police to arrest . . . offender[s] whenever the 
police officer determines that a crime has been committed and probable cause for arrest exists.‖ 
Id. at 21. Jasper states her belief that these policies send a message of zero tolerance toward 
crimes of domestic violence in the community. Id. 
 25. Id. Under DOJ‘s Grants to Encourage Arrest Policies program, ―[l]aw enforcement 
officers are being trained to identify patterns of abuse, and to provide the immediate support 
and protection a domestic violence victim requires, including shelter and counseling, medical 
care, and legal assistance.‖ Id. 
 26. Id. at 22. One such program is the Community Oriented Policing Services (―COPS‖) 
Office, which was established to add 100,000 police officers across the country to promote 
community policing. Id. Funding is granted to police departments that collaborate with 
nonprofits and non-governmental groups to combat domestic violence. Id. The program seeks 
to educate individuals who know a domestic violence victim or offender and/or those who 
witness acts of domestic violence. Id. An example of a successful outcome from education 
provided under the program is the case of a woman in Virginia who went to the hospital with a 
black eye and asked that the nurse not call the police for fear of further abuse from her husband. 
Id. at 22–23. The nurse, against the victim‘s wishes, called the police to report the suspected 
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Although problems with implementation still exist, many 
governmental, nonprofit, and private entities are involved in ongoing 
efforts to make the programs against domestic violence stronger and 
more effective.
27
 
B. The Lautenberg Amendment 
The GCA is a well-known example of a legislative effort to 
combat domestic violence. It established strict regulations of ―the 
manufacture, sale, transfer, and possession of firearms and 
ammunition.‖28 ―Section 922(g) of the GCA delineates nine classes 
of individuals who are prohibited from shipping, transporting, 
possessing or receiving firearms or ammunition in interstate 
commerce.‖29 Congress added the ninth category of individuals in 
September 1996 as part of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 1997.
30
 This addition, known as the ―Lautenberg 
Amendment,‖ ―makes it unlawful for ‗any person . . . who has been 
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence‘ to ship, 
transport, possess, or receive firearms or ammunition in or affecting 
commerce.‖31 Senator Frank Lautenberg, who proposed the 
amendment, was troubled that federal gun laws prohibited only 
convicted felons from possessing firearms despite the fact that many 
 
domestic violence and, afterward, the woman attributed her freedom from the violent 
relationship to the nurse‘s concern and action. Id. at 23. 
 27. See id. For example, one major problem with implementation of the programs to aid 
domestic violence victims, including women and children, is helping those victims who live in 
rural areas. See id. at 21–22. Two concerns include a fear of slow police response to calls 
reporting domestic violence and fear that women will not report abuse because they worry 
about suffering a loss of reputation in a small, rural community. Id. at 21. VAWA addressed 
these problems by establishing funding programs specifically to help victims in rural areas. Id. 
The goal of grants set out under this program is to: ―(i) create training programs for those most 
likely to be in contact with domestic violence victims, such as law enforcement, shelter 
workers, health care providers, and clergy; (ii) increase public awareness and implement 
community education campaigns; and (iii) expand direct services for rural and Native American 
victims and their children.‖ Id. at 21–22.  
 28. HALSTEAD, supra note 9, at 1.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 2. 
 31. Id. (alteration in original); see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006) (making it unlawful 
for any person ―who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of violence,‖ to 
ship, transport, possess or receive ammunition or firearms in interstate commerce). 
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abusers and batterers were only convicted of misdemeanors.
32
 The 
Senator stated that the amendment ―closes this dangerous loophole 
and keeps guns away from violent individuals who threaten their own 
families.‖33 
In order for an individual to qualify as having been convicted of a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under section 922(g)(9), the 
underlying conviction must include an offense with an element that 
requires ―the use or attempted use of physical force.‖34 The statute 
broadly defines the types of domestic relationships between a victim 
and an offender that must exist for there to be a crime of ―domestic‖ 
violence;
35
 yet, according to both the Eighth Circuit and the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (―ATF‖), ―a predicate offense is 
not required to contain an explicit element referring to domestic 
violence.‖36 The ATF defines the term ―misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence‖ as ―misdemeanors that involve the use or 
attempted use of physical force (e.g., simple assault, assault, and 
battery) if the offense is committed by one of the defined parties. 
This is true whether or not the State statute or local ordinance 
 
 32. 142 CONG. REC. 19,415 (1996).  
 33. Id. The legislative history of the Lautenberg Amendment emphasizes the often 
minimal punishment received by domestic violence offenders. See, e.g., id. To demonstrate this, 
Senator Lautenberg used the hypothetical of a man who ―beat his wife brutally and was 
prosecuted, but like most wife beaters, he pleaded down to a misdemeanor and got away with a 
slap on the wrist.‖ 142 CONG. REC. 26,674 (1996). Lautenberg‘s hope was to keep such a man 
from owning a gun and thereby prevent escalation in violent situations. See id. at 26,674–75. 
 34. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 35. Id. The full text of § 921(a)(33)(A) states:  
[T]he term ―misdemeanor crime of domestic violence‖ means an offense that—(i) is a 
misdemeanor under Federal, State or Tribal law; and (ii) has, as an element, the use or 
attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed 
by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with 
whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has 
cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly 
situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim. 
§ 921(33)(A). 
 36. HALSTEAD, supra note 9, at 3; see also United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 620 (8th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that ―while § 921(a)(33) requires proof of a domestic relationship, it 
requires the predicate misdemeanor to have only one element: the use or attempted use of 
physical force (or its alternative, the threatened use of a deadly weapon)‖).  
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specifically defines the offense as a domestic violence 
misdemeanor.‖37  
C. Circuit Split 
There is a split among the circuits concerning the meaning of 
―physical force‖ under section 922(g) in the context of state 
misdemeanor domestic violence statutes.
38
 The Seventh, Ninth, and 
Tenth Circuits hold that the term ―physical force,‖ as used in section 
921(a)(33)(A)(ii) requires more than ―mere touching.‖39 The First, 
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits require a much lower standard to 
satisfy the ―physical force‖ requirement of the statute.40 
The Tenth Circuit examined the phrase ―physical force‖ in United 
States v. Hays.
41
 ―Steven Daniel Hays was indicted under § 922(g)(9) 
. . . for possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.‖42 The Wyoming statute at 
issue stated that a person could be convicted of ―battery if he 
unlawfully touches another in a rude, insolent or angry manner or 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to 
another.‖43 The Tenth Circuit, in determining the congressional intent 
behind the term ―physical force,‖ stated that ―[b]ecause neither 
§ 922(g)(9) nor § 921(a)(33)(A) defines the term ‗physical force,‘ 
 
 37. HALSTEAD, supra note 9, at 3. 
 38. The following cases lie on the side of the circuit split that agrees that ―physical force‖ 
must entail more than ―mere contact‖: United States v. Hays, 526 F.3d 674 (10th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003); Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666 (7th 
Cir. 2003). The other circuits contend that a much lower standard applies to the ―physical force‖ 
requirement of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). See United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 
617 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 39. See, e.g., Hays, 526 F.3d at 678. The Hays court required more than ―mere touching‖ 
and defined the term ―force‖ as referring to ―destructive or violence force.‖ Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Nason, 269 F.3d at 16–17 (stating the Congress clearly intended that section 
922(g)(9) ―encompass misdemeanor crimes involving all types of physical force, regardless of 
whether they could reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury‖). 
 41. See Hays, 526 F.3d at 676–81. 
 42. Id. at 675.  
 43. Id. (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-501(b) (2009)). Mr. Hays argued that ―mere 
touching . . . [was] not the type of ‗physical force‘ contemplated by the federal statute 
[§ 921(a)(33)(A)], and that his predicate conviction . . . was therefore inadequate to support the 
charge in the indictment.‖ Id. 
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‗. . . [the court] look[s] to the ―ordinary . . .‖ meanings of the words 
used.‘‖44 The Tenth Circuit pointed to the Supreme Court‘s decision 
in Leocal v. Ashcroft,
45
 which defined a ―crime of violence,‖ as well 
as decisions from other circuits, to conclude that ―physical force‖ 
requires more than mere rude or insolent contact.
46
 The court 
determined that the Wyoming statute defining battery as touching in a 
―rude,‖ ―insolent,‖ or ―angry‖ manner did not satisfy § 921(a)(33)(A) 
because it ―embraces conduct that does not include ‗use or attempted 
use of physical force.‘‖47 
To bolster its argument, the Tenth Circuit in Hays examined the 
legislative history of the Lautenberg Amendment.
48
 Senator 
Lautenberg stated that those who would be targeted by the 
amendment would be ―people who show they cannot control 
themselves and are prone to fits of violent rage, directed, 
unbelievably enough, against their own loved ones.‖49 The court 
focused on statistics regarding death resulting from domestic violence 
 
 44. Id. at 677. The court first looked to the Black‘s Law Dictionary definition of ―force‖ 
and ―physical force.‖ Id. The dictionary ―defines ‗force‘ as ‗[p]ower, violence, or pressure 
directed against a person or thing,‘ and ‗physical force‘ as ‗[f]orce consisting in a physical act, 
esp. a violent act directed against a robbery victim.‘‖ Id. (citing BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 
673 (8th ed. 2004)).  
 45. 543 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 46. Id. The Leocal decision focused on the definition of a ―‗crime of violence‘ within the 
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16.‖ Id. (citing Leocal, 543 U.S. at 4). The court noted: 
Section 16 defines ―crime of violence‖ to mean: (a) an offense that has as an element 
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or 
property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, 
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another 
may be used in the course of committing the offence. 
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006)). 
 47. Id. at 679 (citing United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003)). To 
illustrate its point, the Court explained:  
For example, in the midst of an argument a wife might angrily point her finger at her 
husband and he, in response, might swat it away with his hand. This touch might very 
well be considered ―rude‖ or ―insolent‖ in the context of a vehement verbal argument, 
but it does not entail ―use of physical force‖ in anything other than an exceedingly 
technical and scientific way. 
Id.  
 48. Id. at 680. The Tenth Circuit looked at Senator Lautenberg‘s speech on the Senate 
Floor to determine why Congress added section 922(g)(9) to the statute. Id. 
 49. Id. (quoting 142 CONG. REC. 19,415 (1996)). The Senator also stated that ―2,000 
American children are killed each year from abuse inflicted by a parent or caretaker.‖ Id. 
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as well as Lautenberg‘s use of strong language like ―violent rage‖ to 
determine that Congress intended to keep guns out of the hands of 
violent domestic abusers rather than those who only inflicted de 
minimis touches.
50
  
The Tenth Circuit‘s decision in Hays was in line with the Seventh 
Circuit‘s decision in Flores v. Ashcroft.51 In Flores, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence for 
―attack[ing] and beat[ing] his wife even though prior violence had led 
to an order barring . . . any contact with her.‖52 The Indiana battery 
statute to which Flores pleaded guilty stated that battery included 
―any touching in a rude, insolent, or angry manner.‖53 Like the court 
in Hays, the Seventh Circuit addressed section 16‘s definition of the 
term ―crime of violence.‖54 The court determined that, although 
rudeness ―has nothing to do with force, . . . both touching and injury 
have a logical relation to the ‗use of physical force‘ under § 16(a).‖55 
In determining that the Indiana statute did not satisfy the 
definition of ―physical force‖ under section 921(a)(33)(A), the Flores 
court stated that under that statute, ―[a]ny contact counts as a ‗touch,‘ 
including slight or indirect touches.‖56 The court found that it was 
 
 50. Id. The Tenth Circuit stated that the comments that Senator Lautenberg made on the 
Senate floor 
make clear that Congress broadened the scope of § 922(g) to encompass misdemeanor 
crimes of domestic violence not out of a hope to keep guns out of the hands of 
individuals who may have inflicted de minimus touches on their spouses or children, 
but to keep guns out of the hands of domestic abusers who previously fell outside the 
bounds of the statute because they were convicted of misdemeanors rather than 
felonies due to ―outdated thinking‖ or plea bargains. 
Id. 
 51. 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 52. Id. at 670. Because bodily injury resulted from Flores‘s attack on his wife, he received 
a one-year sentence. Id. The court stated that ―Flores did not tickle his wife with a feather 
during a domestic quarrel, causing her to stumble and bruise her arm. That would not have led 
to a prosecution, let alone to a year‘s imprisonment.‖ Id.  
 53. Id. at 669. ―Indiana law provides: ‗(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally 
touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery, a Class B 
misdemeanor. However the offense is: (1) a Class A misdemeanor if: (A) it results in bodily 
injury to any other person.‘‖ Id.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. The court stated that Indiana‘s judiciary previously determined that ―any physical 
hurt satisfies section 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(A). So if the paper airplane inflicts a paper cut, the 
snowball causes a yelp of pain, or a squeeze of the arm causes a bruise, the aggressor has 
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important to maintain the boundaries between violent and non-violent 
offenses and thus insisted that ―force‖ should imply violence.57 The 
court held that although ―Flores‘s acts were on the ‗force‘ side of the 
legal line, the elements of his offense were on the ‗contact‘ side.‖58 
The court reached this holding by following the instructions of 
section 16(a), which state that ―the elements rather than the real 
activities are dispositive in misdemeanor cases. . . .‖59 
In United States v. Belless, the Ninth Circuit aligned itself with the 
Seventh and Tenth Circuits and held that ―physical force‖ under title 
18 section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) required the violent use of physical force 
against another, and ―mere touching‖ would not be sufficient to 
satisfy the definition.
60
 ―Robert Belless was convicted of illegally 
possessing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).‖61 The 
 
committed a Class A misdemeanor . . . . It is hard to describe any of this as ‗violence.‘‖ Id. at 
670. 
 57. Id. at 672. The court stated:  
To avoid collapsing the distinction between violent and non-violent offenses, we must 
treat the word ―force‖ as having a meaning in the legal community that differs from its 
meaning in the physics community. The way to do this is to insist that the force be 
violent in nature—the sort that is intended to cause bodily injury, or at a minimum 
likely to do so. 
Id. The courts found that a failure to draw this distinction would lead to the result of ―physical 
force against‖ and ―physical contact with‖ meaning the same thing—a clearly unreasonable 
result. Id. The court offered examples of actions on either side of the line: ―an offensive 
touching is on the ‗contact‘ side‖ and ―a punch is on the ‗force‘ side.‖ Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. In the concurring opinion, Judge Evans argued that the majority‘s strict adherence 
to section 16(a)‘s instructions to follow the elements, rather than the ―real conduct,‖ of the act is 
misplaced. Id. at 673 (Evans, J., concurring). Judge Evans stated:  
If it is permissible to look at Flores‘ ―real conduct‖ to determine if the person he beat 
was his wife rather than some stranger, why does it no make perfectly good sense to 
allow [a] . . . judge to look at what he really did in other respects as well, rather than 
restrict the judge to a cramped glance at the ―elements‖ of a cold statute? The more 
information upon which the judge acts, the better. A common-sense review here 
should lead one to conclude that Flores committed a ―crime of domestic violence.‖ 
Id. 
 60. United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2003).  
 61. Id. at 1064. Belless argued that his conviction was invalid because his ―prior 
misdemeanor conviction [w]as not within . . . [18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)]‘s definition of a crime of 
domestic violence, as set out in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) . . . .‖ Id. at 1064–65.  
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underlying misdemeanor conviction arose from an assault and battery 
he committed against his wife.
62
 
The Wyoming statute at issue in Belless prohibits ―unlawfully 
touch[ing] another in a rude, insolent or angry manner or 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury to 
another.‖63 The Ninth Circuit found that ―[a]ny touching constitutes 
‗physical force‘ in the sense of Newtonian mechanics.‖ In the 
criminal context, however, ―the physical force to which the federal 
statute refers is not de minimis.‖64 The court contrasted the federal 
statute with the ―Wyoming statute [which] criminalizes conduct that 
is minimally forcible. . . .‖65 
 
 62. Id. at 1065. Belless was accused of ―grabbing . . . [his wife‘s] chest/neck area and 
pushing her against her car in an angry manner.‖ Id. Following his conviction, ―Belless was 
sentenced to serve ninety days, all suspended except for the time‖ he spent in jail awaiting his 
final sentence. Id. He was required to pay a fine of $270 and given six months probation. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1067. Belless argued that because the Wyoming statute did not include, as an 
element, that the offender and victim share a domestic relationship specified in 18 U.S.C. 
section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), he was not guilty of an underlying crime as required in the federal 
statute. Id. at 1065–66. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument by stating that the ―federal 
statute does not require that the misdemeanor statute charge a domestic relationship as an 
element. It requires only that the misdemeanor have been committed against a person who was 
in one of the specified domestic relationships.‖ Id. at 1066.  
 64. Id. at 1067–68. The court invokes the ―traditional doctrine of noscitur a sociis, that 
‗the meaning of doubtful words may be determined by reference to associated words and 
phrases.‘‖ Id. at 1068. The court states that ―[i]n the federal definition the associated phrase 
[with ‗physical force‘] is ‗threatened use of a deadly weapon,‘‖ and such threat can only mean a 
―gravely serious threat to apply physical force.‖ Id.  
 65. Id. The court pointed to the example of Vice President Richard Nixon, in 1959, 
jabbing his finger into Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev‘s chest and yelling in his face after 
the Soviet Premier made offensive comments regarding American consumerism. Id. The court 
stated that if such an ungentlemanly act had been committed in Wyoming, the Vice President 
might have been charged with the same act as Belless. Id. The court stated: 
The ungentlemanly act of hollering in anyone‘s face, much less a chief of state‘s, may 
be characterized as ―insolent,‖ and pointing a finger at someone, much less touching 
him with the finger, may fairly be characterized as ―rude,‖ and both men, though 
perhaps exaggerating their affect for the crowd, looked ―angry.‖ 
Id. The court found that the Wyoming statute, while it may provide for acts that would lead to 
violence, also includes merely ―impolite‖ acts, so it cannot qualify under the federal statute. Id. 
In its explanation, the Ninth Circuit failed to address the serious issue at hand regarding 
domestic violence such as the violence which occurred between Belless and his wife. See id. 
There is no indication that finger jabbing and yelling between two heads of state is in any way 
analogous to a man grabbing his wife‘s chest and neck and pushing her against a car in an angry 
manner, which is exactly what happened in the case at hand. See id.  
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In United States v. Griffith,
66
 the Eleventh Circuit determined that 
the phrase ―physical force‖ does not necessitate the direct violence 
required by the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.
67
 In Griffith, Jerry 
Lee Griffith was convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence after he hit his wife and dragged her across the floor.
68
 Two 
years later, Griffith ―was found in possession of a firearm. That led to 
a conditional guilty plea to one count of violating § 922(g)(9).‖69 The 
Georgia statute under which Griffith was convicted provided that an 
individual was guilty of ―simple battery when he or she . . . 
intentionally makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking 
nature with the person of another.‖70 
In analyzing the meaning of the Georgia statute, the court stated 
that an individual could not satisfy the physical contact requirement 
without exerting some level of physical force.
71
 The court held that ―a 
person cannot make physical contact . . . of an insulting or provoking 
nature . . . without physical force,‖ and noted that Congress‘s explicit 
requirement of the use of violent physical force in other portions of 
the statute demonstrated that Congress knew how to require more 
than ―simple physical force.‖72 
 
 66. 455 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 67. Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1344–46.  
 68. Id. at 1340. The state court records stated that the ―first count was for making ‗contact 
of an insulting and provoking nature to Delores Griffith, his wife, by hitting her,‘‖ and that the 
―second count was for ‗intentionally mak[ing] contact of an insulting and provoking nature to 
Delores Griffith, his wife, by dragging her across the floor.‘‖ Id. (alteration in original). 
 69. Id.  
The condition of the plea being that Griffith could appeal the district court‘s denial of 
his motion to dismiss the indictment. The sole ground of that motion to dismiss was 
Griffith‘s contention that his prior Georgia misdemeanor conviction was not a valid 
predicate offense to sustain his current conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). 
Id. 
 70. Id. at 1341 (citing GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-5-23(a)(1) (2007)). 
 71. Id. at 1342. In Griffith, the Eleventh Circuit also looked to the plain meaning of the 
words of the statute and the dictionary definition of what it found to be the key words of section 
921(a)(33)(A)(ii): ―physical force.‖ Id. It found that the plain meaning of ―physical force‖ is 
―power, violence, or pressure directed against a person‖ ―consisting in a physical act.‖ Id. 
(citing BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 673 (8th ed. 2004); United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 16 
(1st Cir. 2001)). 
 72. Id. at 1342–43. The Eleventh Circuit specifically looked to section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii), 
what they called a ―close neighbor‖ of section 921. Id. Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) is ―part of 
provision restricting firearm possession by anyone subject to a court order that prohibits the 
‗use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force . . . that would reasonably be expected 
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In reaching its holding that ―simple physical contact‖ is enough to 
satisfy section 921(a)(33)(A), the Eleventh Circuit explicitly rejected 
the reasoning in Flores and Belless.
73
 It stated that its decision, unlike 
the holdings in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, did not defy common 
sense, because it refused to ―read into a statutory definition a word 
that was not there—inserting ‗violent‘ before the words ‗physical 
force.‘‖74 
In United States v. Smith, the Eighth Circuit held that the 
defendant‘s prior simple misdemeanor assault conviction satisfied the 
―physical force‖ requirement of section 922(g)(9).75 In Smith, 
William Maurice Smith pleaded guilty to two firearm charges after 
committing a crime of domestic violence during which he shot and 
wounded Lauralee Lorenson, the mother of his child, during an 
argument.
76
 The Iowa misdemeanor assault statute under which 
Smith had previously pleaded guilty stated that ―a generic assault 
may include, as an element, placing another in fear of imminent 
physical contact.‖77 
 
to cause bodily injury.‘‖ Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii)). The Griffith court relied on 
the rule of statutory interpretation directing that where Congress has put language in one section 
of a statute and omitted that language in another section of the same Act, ―it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.‖ Id. at 1342.  
 73. Id. at 1345. The court noted the concurring opinion in Flores, which stated that the 
majority‘s decision was correct on the law, but did not comport with common sense. Id. See 
also Flores, 350 F.3d at 672–73. The Flores concurrence also stated that individuals are not 
arrested for ―expending a Newton of force against victims.‖ Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1345 (citing 
Flores, 350 F.3d at 672).  
 74. Id. In arguing against the Seventh and Ninth Circuit‘s reading of ―physical force‖ as 
―violent physical force,‖ the Eleventh Circuit used the well-established law from Duncan v. 
Walker to show that, while the reading of a restrictive word into the statute may ―guard against 
an absurd result that it admits has little or no basis in the real world,‖ the court actually reached 
a result that was illogical and absurd in itself. Id.  
 75. United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 76. Id. at 619. Smith was twenty years old at the time he bought a gun with a driver‘s 
license that falsely listed his age as twenty-one. Id. He was convicted of one count of making 
false representations in connection with the purchase of a firearm and one count of possessing a 
firearm after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Id. The court 
sentenced him to a fifty-one month prison sentence, followed by a three-year term of supervised 
release. Id.  
 77. Id. at 620. The state statute  
defin[ed] ―assault‖ as occurring when a person does any of the following: (1) Any act 
which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result in physical 
contact which will be insulting or offensive to another. . . . (2) Any act which is 
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The record in Smith indicates that Smith grabbed the mother of his 
child by the throat and pushed her down.
78
 The Eighth Circuit stated 
that this sufficed to show a violation of the Iowa Code ―for 
committing an act intended to cause pain, injury or offensive or 
insulting physical contact, rather than . . . for placing one in fear of 
such contact,‖ and thus Smith pleaded guilty to a predicate offense 
that contained an element of physical force sufficient to satisfy 
section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).
79
 
II. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
The historical context and more recent statistical and sociological 
studies concerning domestic violence provide a background for the 
circuit split regarding the level of force required to satisfy the 
―physical force‖ requirement in section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Society‘s 
view of victims of domestic violence has shifted from blaming the 
victim to addressing the perpetrator‘s behavior and shaping the law to 
prevent harm to the victim. Of particular mention are the studies 
noting the prevalence of domestic violence and how a battered 
woman can be reluctant to leave an abusive relationship.
80
 Although 
 
intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, 
injurious, insulting or offensive . . . . 
Id.  
 78. Id. at 621. The court acknowledged that Smith argued that the applicable Iowa statute 
―contains, as an element, physical contact that is merely insulting or offensive. Id. at 621 n.2. 
However, the court did not accept Smith‘s argument, because it determined that ―such physical 
contact, by necessity, requires physical force to complete.‖ Id.  
 79. Id. at 621. In this case, Smith also argued that the predicate misdemeanor must have, 
as an element, ―a domestic relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, and argues that 
[Smith‘s] predicate offense of simple assault does not contain this element.‖ Id. at 620. The 
court held that, while section 921(a)(33) does require ―proof of a domestic relationship, it 
requires the predicate misdemeanor only to have one element: the use or attempted use of 
physical force (or its alternative, the threatened use of a deadly weapon, a situation not here 
presented).‖ Id. The court bolstered its argument both by looking to the plain language of the 
statute and to the legislative history. See id. The court cites Senator Lautenberg: ―[C]onvictions 
for domestic violence-related crimes often are for crimes, such as assault, that are not explicitly 
identified as related to domestic violence.‖ Id. (citing 142 CONG. REC. S11,872-01, *S11,878 
(1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg)). The court determined that this statement, as well as 
other parts of the legislative history, shows that ―Congress evinced its intent that the predicate 
offense need not contain a domestic relationship as an element.‖ Id. 
 80. See MAHONEY, supra note 7, at 10, 65–68. In her article, Professor Mahoney points 
out that physical violence may appear or increase when a woman chooses to separate herself 
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some circuits have chosen to require more than ―mere touching‖ or 
words to fulfill the ―physical force‖ requirement, commentators have 
noted that women who are involved in an abusive relationship that 
falls short of such a definition are often trapped in a dangerous 
relationship.
81
 Their attempts to leave their abusive partners 
precipitate violence.
82
 
As the issues involved in abusive relationships become clearer, 
including the power and control dynamics between the victim and the 
abuser, interpreting and defining the law becomes more complicated. 
In the studies conducted by Dobash and Dobash, results indicate that 
men and women‘s reports of physical violence and controlling 
behavior can differ significantly.
83
 These differences show that 
defining violence involves subjectivity, and that while violence may 
be used to control behavior, it is not always necessary.
84
  
Despite these complexities, the history of the law relating to 
violence against women indicates an ongoing effort to address the 
challenges involved in recognizing and preventing further abuse.
85
 
Enforcement and treatment programs, like those instituted by the 
Department of Justice, indicate a growing effort to recognize crimes 
 
from her violent spouse or lover. Id. at 65–68. 
 81. See, e.g., id. 
 82. Id. Professor Mahoney‘s discussion implies that the female victim should not be 
blamed for failing to leave an abusive relationship. Id. Mahoney states that, as courts and 
lawmakers become more conscious of the power structure involved in abusive relationships, 
and as they become more aware of the dangers involved in separation, it will be possible to 
make ―women‘s experience comprehensible in law.‖ Id. at 71. 
 83. See Dobash & Dobash, supra note 12, at 155–62. Dobash and Dobash found that 
women infrequently characterized controlling behavior as ―insignificant‖ and more often 
characterized such behavior as ―serious‖ or ―very serious.‖ Id. at 161. The authors suggest that 
such characterizations often stem from a victim‘s knowledge and experience with violent 
actions that often follow controlling behavior. Id. These results indicate that women frequently 
correctly perceive controlling behavior as closely connected with physical violence.  
 84. Id. at 161. Dobash and Dobash found that ―certain ‗looks‘ and moods, pointing in an 
aggressive manner, swearing, calling names, and criticizing can be used by men to control 
women and display signs of potential danger.‖ Id. at 160. The authors also point out that these 
controlling behaviors, when coupled with the fact that the aggressor is often larger and 
physically stronger than the victim, are even more coercive and threatening to the victim. Id. at 
160–61. 
 85. These efforts include the Violence Against Women Act, the Lautenberg Amendment, 
and related studies and programs aimed at enforcement, education, and prevention. See 
discussion supra Part I. 
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of domestic violence as serious criminal offenses.
86
 Law 
enforcement‘s growing awareness that immediate and more serious 
measures are required to aid domestic violence victims perhaps 
indicates that courts should take greater action in order to prevent 
further violence, particularly in the case of known abusers. 
Viewed in the context of these studies, the definition of ―physical 
force‖ and the accompanying complexities grow extremely 
important. Senator Lautenberg‘s statements regarding the Lautenberg 
Amendment provide a useful place to begin unpacking the meaning 
of ―physical force‖ and understanding how this definition plays a role 
in preventing domestic violence.
87
 The Senator explicitly stated that 
the amendment was intended to ―keep guns away from violent 
individuals who threaten their own families.‖88 From this statement, it 
appears implicit that the Senator intended for action to be taken 
against those who pose a threat, and not just those who already had 
taken some egregiously violent act.
89
  
In beginning to explore and define ―physical force‖ in the context 
of sections 922(g)(9) and 921(a)(33)(A), the Tenth Circuit took the 
straightforward approach of examining the plain meaning of the 
words ―physical force‖ in Hays.90 The Tenth Circuit also looked to 
the legislative history and statistical studies related to domestic 
violence.
91
 In focusing on Senator Lautenberg‘s statement that the 
 
 86. See JASPER, supra note 17, at 20–21. The programs recognize the need for immediate 
assistance and support on the part of law enforcement for victims of domestic violence. Id. 
 87. See supra text accompanying notes 32 and 33. The Senator spoke directly to 
preventing those who pose a threat to their own families from owning guns. Id. 
 88. See supra text accompanying note 33. While not conclusive of what the definition of 
―physical force‖ does or should mean, looking to the statements of the Senator who proposed 
the bill certainly provides a firm foundation from which to interpret the provision‘s meaning. 
 89. As demonstrated in the many studies regarding domestic violence, threats of violence 
are often the precursors to acts of violence. See, e.g., DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 12, at 
160–61. Often this is seen in the context of separation assault, where the abuser threatens his 
spouse with violence if she attempts to leave him. See MAHONEY, supra note 7, at 71–79. As 
Professor Mahoney states: ―Separation assault provides a link between past violence and 
current legal disputes by illuminating the custody action as part of an ongoing attempt, through 
physical violence and legal manipulation, to force the woman to make concessions or return to 
the violent partner.‖ Id. at 78. Thus, although a batterer may not have committed a serious act of 
physical violence in the past, this does not preclude future violent action. Moreover, past threats 
can foreshadow future violent abuse.  
 90. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.  
 91. See supra notes 48 and 49 and accompanying text. As noted in Rethinking Violence 
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amendment was intended to target those who could not control 
themselves and were ―prone to fits of violent rage,‖ the court 
determined that the amendment meant to exclude those incidents 
where any touching or gesturing did not, or could not have, resulted 
in injury.
92
  
Although the Tenth Circuit determined that a husband swatting 
away a wife‘s pointing finger did not constitute a situation in which 
physical force was used, the example used may have been too 
convenient.
93
 In light of the numerous studies regarding the use of 
force and violence in domestic relationships, it seems that the court 
would need to take a more complete inventory of the relationship in 
order to understand the action‘s significance.94 While a swat may not 
seem violent in one isolated incident, it may represent much more in 
the context of a violent or potentially violent relationship. 
The Seventh Circuit, in Flores aligned itself with the Tenth 
Circuit when it determined that touching in a ―rude, insolent, or angry 
manner‖ did not satisfy the definition of ―physical force.‖95 The court 
emphasized the importance of maintaining boundaries between 
violent and non-violent offenses.
96
 By focusing too strictly on the 
 
against Women, statistical studies of domestic violence pose a variety of challenges to the 
researcher. See Dobash & Dobash, supra note 12, at 23–31. Yet, despite the possible 
inaccuracies of these studies, they may be useful to courts as one of many factors influencing a 
court‘s decision. For example, statistics could be helpful in defining the context and probability 
of future violence. In surveying the legislative history, the court focused on words such as ―wife 
beaters,‖ ―child abusers,‖ and ―those who commit family violence.‖ United States v. Hays, 526 
F.3d 674, 679 (10th Cir. 2008). The last is the most difficult to interpret, as family violence 
does not appear exclusively to mean physical violence. Nevertheless, in terms of supporting a 
public policy that prevents any spousal or child abuse (including neglect, a non-violent 
activity), it would be prudent to err on the side of over-inclusiveness. 
 92. See id. In Hays, the court gave the example of a wife who might ―angrily point her 
finger at her husband and he, in response, might swat it away with his hand.‖ Id. The court 
determined that, although this might be rude, it did not amount to ―physical force.‖ Id.  
 93. See id. The court spoke directly to a ―rude‖ or ―insolent‖ action that would not amount 
to any physical harm or injury and stated that it certainly was not the type of action Congress 
intended to cover in section 922(g)(9). Id. 
 94. Dobash and Dobash list some points of argument and contextual issues that lead to 
violence in the domestic setting: ―the woman‘s domestic work, the man‘s jealousy, money, the 
man‘s use of alcohol, and assorted issues relating to children, other family members, and 
friends.‖ Dobash & Dobash, supra note 12, at 145. 
 95. Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2003); see supra text accompanying 
notes 52–56.  
 96. See supra text accompanying note 57. The court drew a line between ―contact‖ and 
―force,‖ with the former failing to satisfy the definition of ―physical force‖ and the latter 
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―elements,‖ rather than looking at the full context, including the 
defendant‘s conduct and the past and current condition of the 
relationship between the defendant and his victim, the court may 
have missed the intent of the statute: to prevent domestic violence.
97
 
The court needed to take a broader view of what constitutes a violent 
act and take into account more than the strict ―elements‖ of the act.  
Belless offers a compelling example of domestic abuse identified 
as non-violent.
98
 The court aligned with the Tenth and Seventh 
Circuits and determined that the defendant‘s act of taking his wife 
and ―grabbing her chest/neck area and pushing her against her car in 
an angry manner‖ did not satisfy the ―physical force‖ requirement of 
section 922(g)(9).
99
 Belless avoided both a conviction under section 
922(g)(9) and a minimal jail sentence; his only punishment was a 
$270 fine.
100
 Again, one might ask whether the Ninth Circuit failed to 
properly take Belless‘s acts in the context of a perhaps broader 
pattern of angry or violent behavior and failed to fulfill the intent of 
the Lautenberg Amendment, which was to prevent continued and 
more serious violence on the part of those with a predisposition for 
violent behavior.
101
 
Representing the other side of the circuit split, the Eleventh 
Circuit determined that violent physical force was not required to 
fulfill the ―physical force‖ requirement of section 922(g)(9). The 
Eleventh Circuit, in Griffith, followed a settled rule of statutory 
interpretation to determine that if Congress had intended to require 
―violent physical force,‖ it would have so specified.102 The court 
reasoned that because the word ―violent‖ does not precede the word 
―physical force‖ in the statute, and because Congress knew how to 
 
successfully doing so. See Flores, 350 F.3d at 672. 
 97. See supra text accompanying note 59. Judge Evans‘s concurring opinion supported 
this view that a judge ought to be given more latitude in choosing what to consider in defining 
an act of violence. See Flores, 350 F.3d at 672–73 (Evans, J., concurring). The judge felt that if 
this were allowed, the Flores defendant (and potentially many others) would be found guilty of 
a ―crime of domestic violence.‖ Id.  
 98. See United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 99. Id. at 1065. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See supra notes 32 and 33 and accompanying text. 
 102. See discussion supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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state otherwise, the provision should not be read to require violent 
physical force.
103
 
In the context of the current circuit split regarding statutory 
interpretation, it would be helpful to either get a clearer articulation 
of the rule from Congress or resolve the issue judicially by 
considering Congress‘s policy goals. As Judge Evans suggested in 
Flores, it would be better policy to allow a judge more freedom to 
consider the context of each violent or potentially violent act rather 
than requiring a judge to adhere strictly to elements of a statute.
104
 
Although critics of this view may suggest that adhering to a statute‘s 
elements is the standard and widely accepted method of statutory 
interpretation, it is important to take into account the policy goals of 
the Lautenberg Amendment and the unique history and sociological 
underpinnings of domestic violence law.  
Courts play a vital role in recognizing and preventing future 
domestic abuse.
105
 Although a court may not consider an act of 
domestic violence so violent that it causes serious injury, in light of 
the policy concerns and history of domestic violence going 
unreported and unpunished, the judiciary ought to pay special 
attention to the abuser and the implicit threats caused by the abuser‘s 
actions.
106
 In addressing each specific case, the court should also take 
into account the implications of allowing an abusive individual to 
possess a firearm, regardless of whether the individual has yet caused 
serious harm to a victim.
107
 Moreover, courts should familiarize 
 
 103. See discussion supra note 72. 
 104. See Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 672 (Evans, J., concurring). 
 105. Several studies outlined in this Note indicate that an unacceptably high proportion of 
women experience domestic violence, and that these are not isolated occurrences. See, e.g., 
DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 1, at 37–40. This makes intervention all the more vital. The 
very fact that there is an act of domestic violence, regardless of whether it results in severe 
physical injury, should serve as an early warning sign to law enforcement and courts that a lack 
of interference may result in further, perhaps escalated, acts of violence.  
 106. This conclusion should have become more apparent once studies revealed that the 
odds are already stacked against victims, in that they resist even reporting an act of violence for 
fear of serious, even deadly, retaliation. See MAHONEY, supra note 7. Martha Mahoney 
highlights this fear in her descriptions of ―separation assault‖ and abused women‘s traumas and 
experiences leaving an abusive relationship where the abuser often attempts violent retaliation 
for her leaving. See id. at 71–79; see also DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 12, at 160 (stating 
that there is a disparity in men‘s and women‘s reporting of the ―frequent use (more than five 
times) of ―violent or controlling behaviors). 
 107. When considering the risk of continued harm to victims, courts should take into 
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themselves with the growing body of literature and studies into the 
behavior of domestic violence offenders, the differences between 
non-violent and violent domestic relationships, and the power 
dynamics in abusive relationships. This knowledge will contribute to 
law enforcement and courts‘ understanding of the context and nature 
of domestic violence.
108
 
To assist courts, law enforcement should fully investigate each 
alleged instance of abuse, utilize academic studies of domestic 
violence, and perhaps even take severe precautionary measures. 
Studies indicate that abusive relationships often involve a complex 
set of behaviors that include controlling behavior and alcohol abuse, 
as well as sexual demands and coercion.
109
 Law enforcement can use 
these increasingly in-depth studies of the dynamics of abusive 
relationships to aid their assessments of potentially abusive domestic 
situations. For example, officers called to the scene of an act of 
domestic violence, even when it is not a violent act, could be required 
 
account two different elements. First, a court should consider the effect of putting a firearm into 
the hands of an individual with a known history of domestic abuse. Even if the abuser has only 
made threats or menacing gestures, courts should consider that possession of a firearm gives the 
abuser even more power over the victim. Also, courts should consider the extremely detrimental 
mental and emotional effects that even a threat with a gun may have on a victim. Even if the 
individual never fired the gun, a victim who lives with an abuser who possesses a lethal weapon 
likely lives in a state of constant fear. Dobash & Dobash point out that threats, such as ―feigning 
to strike, and pointing in a threatening manner can all be frightening‖ and take an emotional 
toll, particularly when the abuser is stronger and has shown himself capable of violence. 
Dobash & Dobash, supra note 12, at 160–61. When an abuser has a gun, he has put himself in a 
position where he is stronger and more powerful than his victim simply by virtue of the fact that 
he possesses a deadly weapon.  
 108. Researchers such as Holly Johnson, the director of the Violence Against Women 
Survey, have conducted surveys regarding the experiences of women in abusive relationships. 
DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 1, at 10–11. The results of Johnson‘s study, ―were intended to 
help understand how violent marriages differ from nonviolent ones.‖ Id. at 11. Additionally, 
Johnson‘s study attempted to more accurately predict violence in relationships, in part through a 
focus on ―which personal and interpersonal characteristics of offenders and marital 
relationships predict violence‖ and ―which risk factors predict more serious, potentially life-
threatening assaults.‖ Id. As our understanding of the frequency and effects of domestic 
violence, as well as the predictive importance of specific relational characteristics, continues to 
develop, it can greatly assist courts determine which misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence 
constitute serious enough offenses to determine that a criminal may not possess a firearm.  
 109. See Dobash & Dobash, supra note 12, at 156. These are only a few of the behaviors 
on which Dobash & Dobash focus in studying indicators that lead to domestic violence or 
reveal indications of preexisting domestic violence. See generally Dobash & Dobash, supra 
note 12. 
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to conduct a more thorough investigation into the circumstances and 
to closely monitor the household for a certain period of time.  
Additionally, even if a violent act is not committed, law 
enforcement could require a mandatory separation period during 
which the victim would be removed from the abuser and receive 
access to counseling. Although some may view this as paternalistic or 
an invasion of liberty or privacy, it may be necessary and in the best 
interest of the victim in light of the statistical and anecdotal evidence 
indicating that victims of domestic abuse often are extremely anxious 
to take action against their abusers for fear of further, more violent 
retaliation.
110
 
CONCLUSION 
Through social scientific research, the causes and precursors to 
violent behavior are becoming more evident and identifiable. This 
can provide courts and law enforcement with a stronger foundation 
from which to identify abusive and potentially dangerous situations 
and carry out the spirit of the Lautenberg Amendment, which is to 
identify dangerous individuals and prevent them from possessing 
firearms.
111
 Furthermore, the work being done to investigate and 
clarify the complexities surrounding domestic violence will allow 
courts to make more educated decisions regarding how to apply laws 
like the Lautenberg Amendment. 
In approaching the issue, the judiciary should keep in mind that 
the legislative history of the amendment emphasizes the problem of 
minimal punishment for domestic abuse offenders.
112
 Implicit in this 
congressional concern is the idea that to effectively combat domestic 
violence, the law must provide a strong disincentive for potentially 
violent offenders. In order to do so, it is important that the courts 
properly interpret the definition of ―physical force‖ and do not read 
the statute so strictly that they omit many dangerous offenders. 
 
 110. See, e.g., MAHONEY, supra note 7. 
 111. See supra text accompanying notes 32 and 33. The amendment was proposed and 
enacted to provide stricter regulation of those prone to violence and who threaten family 
members. See United States v. Hays, 526 F.3d 674, 680 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 112. See supra note 33. The Congressional Record reveals that the legislature took issue 
with the fact that many egregious offenders received only ―a slap on the wrist.‖ Id.  
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Although individual rights are a foundational American concept, 
individuals who pose a danger to their families must be denied any 
right to bear arms in order to protect the rights of potential victims. 
Finally, the fact that many law enforcement officers are now 
trained to identify abuse and to provide support is a significant step 
toward helping to end an abusive relationship before it results in 
grave physical harm or even death.
113
 A synthesis of continuing 
scholarship, vigilance on the part of law enforcement, and efforts by 
the judiciary to consider the context of each case will all aid the 
prevention and deterrence of domestic violence. 
 
 113. See supra note 25. Support provided by the officers includes ―shelter and counseling, 
medical care, and legal assistance.‖ Id. While these steps will not solve the problem of domestic 
violence, they are certainly a significant step in the right direction. 
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